Abstract: Th e New Partnership for Africa's Development is the latest in a long line of initiatives or framework intended by African leaders to place African continent on a path of growth and sustainable development. Th e development challenges that face Africa are enormous and varied. Th e crisis of political instability, bad governance, lack of peace and security, poverty and diseases like HIV/AIDs. NEPAD recognized peace and security as condition for good governance and sustainable development. Th erefore, in absence of peace and security, democracy and good governance cannot strive and where there is no good governance, we cannot witness sustainable development. Th is paper argues that peace and security has been elusive in much of Africa. Th e failure of the Organisation of African Unity to ensure peace and security in Africa and to address Africa's post-cold war legion of challenges, the successor organisation, the African Union and its attendant development programme, the NEPAD were established. Th e fi rst issue which is critical to NEPAD is, solving armed confl ict and civil unrest on the continent. Currently, twenty percent of the people of Africa are living in condition of confl ict. Th ese conditions cause terrible suff ering and hold back economic development in the aff ected countries. Th e extent of confl ict is so great that the whole continent is aff ected and this creates a major barrier to inward investment. On the resolution, NEPAD is in a position to make considerable progress. It was learnt in Sierra Lone that with concentrated international eff ort, confl ict can be successfully ended and institutions of a properly functioning state can begin to be rebuilt. Th e paper therefore examines the origin of the NEPAD, NEPAD and challenges of peace and security in Africa and involvement of AU/NEPAD in Darfur and Cote D'Ivoire crises. It further discusses the AU/NEPAD confl ict mechanisms for confl ict prevention, management and resolution and draw conclusion.
Introduction
NEPAD has been hailed as perhaps the boldest new initiative in recent times on the appropriate path which the African continent should be taking towards its long-term development.
2 With its successful democratic transition, South Africa emerged during the second half of the 1990s as a new political factor in the continent. In the late 1990s, the South African President Th abo Mbeki coined and popularized the African Renaissance. While the notion never materialized as a fully fl edged, concise new paradigm, it managed to rally policy-makers, bureaucrats and intellectuals alike behind an idea still highly relevant as a concept of African self-respect, dignity and pride.
3 Inspired by earlier notion of self reliance in the sense of African ownership over Africa's aff airs, the African Renaissance provided a philosophical basis for any policy formulation. Parallel to this philosophical dimension eff orts aimed to position South Africa in terms of its foreign and economic policy in a leadership role within the African continent. 4 Within this process, Mbeki's foreign policy approach could be characterized as 'a complicated and sometimes contradictory mixture of ideology, idealism and pragmatism. '
5 Th is blend competed with ambition for a leading role displayed by other countries, in particular, the agenda by Libya's Col. Gaddafi in transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into African Union (AU). 6 Th is latter eff ort reactivated, though somehow distorted the popular rhetoric of Pan Africanism associated with anti -imperialism during the early days of decolonization -an ideology used to counteract the motion of African Renaissance as the approach refl ected in NEPAD. South Africa's Finance Minister, Trevor Manuel, in a keynote address to the German Foundation for International Development as early as December, 1998 characterised the emerging in a revealing way by asserting 'there is a new resilience and a new will to succeed in the African continent' We the South Africa have called it a renaissance, a new vision of political and economic renewal. It takes the global competitive market place as a point of departure.
Th e fi rst introduction of preliminary results to the international arena can be dated to the briefi ng on the 'Millennium Africa Renaissance Programme' (MAP or MARP) can off ered by president Mbeki to the World Economy Forum Meeting in Davos on 28 th January, 2001 . Th e MAP document originated during a process that begun in 1999 when the South African, Nigerian and Algerian Presidents were mandated by the Exra ordinary of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Summit in Sirte (Libya) to approach Africa's creditors on the total cancellation of Africa's external debt. Th e presidents were tasked further in April, 2000 by the South Summit in Havana to convey the concerns of the South to the G8 Summit in Okinawa in July, 2000 . Th e OAU Summit in Togo in July, 2000 further mandated the Presidents to prepare the Millennium African Recovery Programme. In his presentation at Davos, Th abo Mbeki (who had the support of fellow heads of state, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Ben Mkapa of Tanzania and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal) qualifi ed MAP for the sustainable economic development of the continent. 8 At the Conference of Ministers of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNESCA) in Algeria (8-10 May, 2001) , the South African government presented the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Programme (Pretoria, March, 2001) as the updated and fi nal version of this joint eff ort. At same occasion, President Wade presented an Omega Plan for Africa and the UNECA, a Compact for Africa's Recovery. While the Omega Plan was largely a technocratic reduction of the challenges and the Compact, a mainly operational handbook, the MAP represented a comprehensive attempt to bring the developmental challenges into a historical, cultural, political and economic framework. It was decided that the documents should be tabled in a merged version at the OAU Summit in Lusaka. Th is diplomatic compromise prevented the initiative (s) from ending in a cul-de-sac at this early stage.
9 Th e fi nal draft was adopted by the Heads of state at their OAU Summit meeting on 11 th July, 2001 as a New Africa's Initiative (NAI) . Subsequently, at the end of the meeting in Abuja on 23 rd October, 2001 , an Implementation Committee of the Heads of state renamed the document as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Gunmen , 57-59, (2001) 9 Only hard bargaining managed to prevent Wade's Omega Plan from sabotaging African Unity before it had even begun, particularly when Wade began claiming that his plan was 'a practical initiative for overcoming Africa's economic diffi culties' , while the MARP was 'more of manifesto' . Yet, Wade's plan was extremely problematic and did not deserve the status that it was given 9though no doubt satisfying the ego of its author. ' Also see the full text in Taylor,I ., and Nel, P., New Africa, Globalisation and the Confi nes of Elite Reformism: Getting the Rhetoric Right, Getting the Strategy Wrong 23:1, Th ird World Quarterly, 163-180, (2002) .. 10 Th e full text and related information is accessible at the NEPAD web site (http://www. nepad.org). Th e document and an excellent detailed critical annotation is also included in Bond, P (ed.) (2002b) "Fanon's Warning. A Civil Society Reader on New Partnership for Th e initiative had by then, matured and consolidated under a sort of powerfulsharing arrangement between the more infl uential African countries -Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Egypt and Senegal, at least nominally uniting the main portion of the continent's total annual GDP.
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Since October, 2001, the NEPAD secretariat is based at the Development Bank of Southern Africa in Midrand (South Africa), With President Mbeki's economic adviser Wiseman Nkhulu acted as the fi rst Chief Operating Offi cer. NEPAD has sought increasingly close co-operation with existing institutions like the African Development Bank (ADB), the Economic Commission of Africa (ECA) and the African Union (AU) secretariat to counteract suspicions of running its own show. It advocates confi rmed the aim to ultimately incorporate NEPAD offi ces into the African Union (AU) Headquarters.
12 Th e composition of NEPAD's steering committee confi rmed the current power-sharing arrangement by uniting Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa, the fi ve states involved in the initiative since its early stages.
Other ten African countries have been appointed to an Implementation Committee and selected on a regional representation basis. More recently, as part of the integration of NEPAD into the newly consolidated AU structures and with the aim of refl ecting ownership over the initiative by all African states, more countries and their political leadership from NEPAD critical faction, originally dismissing the initiative as an outward oriented sell-out strategy (such as Libya, but even Zimbabwe) have been either less critical or even co-opted into the NEPAD club, which off ers voluntary association. 13 Notwithstanding the permissive structures and pragmatic eff orts to compromise, NEPAD remains controversial among leaders of African states. It has equally not being given proper recognition by many stakeholders in African societies like churches and mosques, grassroots organisations, trade unions and part of academia who considered the initiative as ideological plunder of a neo-liberal submission toward the powerful in this world.
Africa's Development". Trenton, N.J. Africa World Press. 11 Nigeria, South Africa, alone represented according to World Bank fi gures in 1999 a total of 57% of the GDP in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2001 
Rationale for the Establishment of the New Partnership for Africa's Development in Africa
All of Africa's regions have been affl icted by political tension, civil unrest or violent confl ict. In addition, in task of resolving existing confl icts, the continent is also confronted with the challenge of promoting post-confl ict reconstruction and peace building. Th is paper assesses the policy framework which the African Union (AU) and its programme for economic recovery, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) have developed to address and resolve some security problems confronting most African countries. Th e African Union has the primary responsibility for peace and security on the continent. NEPAD's role is in supporting post -confl ict reconstruction and mobilization of resources for the African Union peace fund.
14 On a continent where about half of the countries are still at serious risk of violent confl ict and instability since decolonization, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is an African-led programme of action to end Africa's global marginalization -a welcome vision for promoting better government, ending Africa' wars and reducing poverty. Good governance is the key focus for ensuring peace and security, without which sustainable development -people-centered economic growth is not possible.
It is conceived that through democracy, macro-economic stability and sustainable socio-economic programmes, all Africa's people can benefi t through national cooperation and unity and for drawing international investments to uniquely African assets that will enhance locally sustainable development. Major areas to address are democratic governance, confl ict resolution and peace keeping with an emphasis on human rights and inclusivity of civil society institutions and diversity of people. Th e imperative to promote peace and security in Africa is critical. Th e political and social vulnerabilities on which confl ict is premised need to be addressed urgently. African regional institutions need to be unskilled to make and keep peace and to deal with reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Th e combating of illicit proliferation of arms and weapons is dangerous, as is support for African states to fi nd their own lasting solutions to existing confl icts and threats to security.
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Confl icts, with their attendant problems of massive human displacement and destruction of lives and properties, constitute the greatest challenge currently facing the African continent. Issues of identity, governance, resource allocation, State sovereignty and power struggle, sometimes coupled with the personality question, have all conspired, not only to cause staggering losses of human lives and environmental degradation but also to make Africa have the unenviable Th erefore, it may not be possible to treat in isolation, the activities of the New Partnership of Africa's Development in ensuring peace and security in Africa, rather in conjunction with its founding father, the Organisation of African Unity now African Union that has been in existence in maintaining peace and security in African states for decades before the birth of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Th erefore, as long as there is interaction between human beings, confl icts will continue to exist. At any rate, most of the good things that people always yearning for in life generate confl icts either because they are in short supply or because they are badly managed. One example that comes immediately to one's mind is the question of economic reform: a concept that has been prescribed as the best cure for Africa's current economic malaise. But appealing as that concept may be, economic reform can turn societies upside down. It raises expectations which, if not fulfi lled, may widen the gap between rich and poor which, in turn, can generate confl icts between the haves and the have-nots. Sometimes, politicians have opened up closed economies but not policies that go with it. But by so doing, people have come to realize that the only way to win political concessions is not through peaceful negotiations but rather through the power of the gun. 16 It follows therefore that if you give people a free economy, you will one day have to give them other related freedoms: the freedom to identify their leaders, the freedom to express themselves on issues aff ecting their lives and the freedom to associate with those they choose to represent them. By off ering people those other freedoms, you will be averting the war of unmet expectations; and this is good governance. Democracy is yet another cherished ideal in Africa which paradoxically can tear societies apart if not properly handled. As an expression of democracy, elections can, indeed act as an eff ective tool for confl ict management. But at the same time, elections can also deepen the degree of dissent and instability, if not properly managed.
Th e above two examples help to demonstrate four things. Firstly, confl icts are not simply an academic issue. Th ey are a practical reality and the role of socioeconomic forces either in generating them or in helping to resolve confl icts is 16 .Capacity in Support of Good Governance, Political Stability, Peace and Security in Africa:
United Nations Economic and Social Council, (20 th April, 1994) . @http://www.uneca.org/ eca resources/major ece website Conference of ministers/20/con20.7e.htm. Accessed on 09/06/2010. quite discernible. Secondly, as long as people continue to rub shoulders with one another, confl icts will continue to exist in human institutions. One cannot, therefore, think of eliminating them altogether. But, as a result of their intensity and multiplication, it is imperative for us to create mechanisms for managing confl icts or scaling them down to acceptable proportions. Indeed, as Professor Ali Mazrui put it on one occasion, "... without a minimum of peace, development is impossible; and without development, peace is not durable. " Th irdly, all good things in nature have a price tag. If we have to develop, we must be prepared to deal with the trade-off s relating to the process of development, namely confl icts. Fourthly, bad policies or lack of good governance can legitimize the birth of confl icts. It follows building critical capacities in Africa in the area of confl ict management have never been as compelling as it is today.
For while increased cooperation between various African countries has, fortunately, helped to reduce inter-State confl icts which were the order of the day during the cold war era, the post-cold war period has ushered in its wake an upsurge of confl icts along regional, ethnic, religious, clan and even sub-clan lines within nations. From Liberia to Somalia, we have seen some African nations almost disintegrate. From Angola to Burundi and Rwanda, we have witnessed death and destruction as a result of confl icts and instability. As the twenty-fi rst century approaches, the imperative for Africa itself in alliance with its friends outside the continent to take a hard look at the scourge of armed confl ict, and to come up with viable mechanisms for confl ict-resolving or management capacities becomes more pressing. Put most simply, for Africa to remain relevant in the new international order, international organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) now African Union/NEPAD must fi ll in the vacuum left behind by cold war engagements in tackling the scourge of confl icts.
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Th e Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa pointed out that in May 1993, 18 "Th e people of Africa have become chronically vulnerable and dependent on international charity, not only for survival but also for the containment and solution of the confl icts perpetrated by the Africans themselves. " Our future generations will not forgive us, when they come to learn of the use of Africa's limited resources for self-destruction. Moreover, we will remain in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) of the international community if we do not utilize our limited resources for meaningful development or if we fail to create the conditions for peace and justice, by ruling with the consent of the governed; ensuring respect for human rights, equitable distribution of resources, suppression of egoism and, above all, establishing a democratic culture that promotes advancement of mankind on merit. Indeed, we all agree that Africa is a continent in transition but we should not turn this transition into a permanent feature. We 17 Layashi Yaker, Welcoming Address at PA/OAU Consultation on "Th e OAU and Confl ict Management in Africa" (African Hall, 19-21, May, 1993) . 18 Id. must assiduously work towards getting to our destiny as soon as possible. For Africa to achieve economic success and avoid being marginalized by the rest of the world, it is imperative that we build an enabling political environment capable of managing confl icts.
Th erefore, it is imperative to examine the involvement of the AU and NEPAD in resolving crises in at least two African countries.
Th e Role of African Union/NEPAD in Confl ict Prevention, Resolution and Management of Confl ict
For the purpose of this paper, confl ict management will be taken to mean a process embracing three main areas of activity. In their descending order, these areas are: (a) Confl ict prevention or peace promotion; (b) Confl ict control or abatement; and (c) Confl ict resolution. Th is approach assumes that there is a baseline of relative peace and harmony in inter-personal relations but due to endogenous or exogenous factors such as shortage or mismanagement of resources, causes of friction may be introduced in a social system. It is the duty of the community in question to immediately identify those causes and prevent them from erupting in a confl ict. Where prevention fails and a full-blown confl ict emerges, then the second stage is reached called confl ict management by which eff orts aimed at diff using, controlling or abating the confl ict are deployed. If that confl ict persists to the extent that people's existence as a harmonious community is visibly threatened, then the third stage is reached called confl ict resolution, characterized by peace-keeping eff orts as well as intensive and extensive negotiations to settle all the fundamental issues involved in the confl ict. Once the fundamental issues are resolved, confl ict management is said to have gone full circle, by which the relationship between the individuals concerned is back to tolerable proportions.
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Based on the above analysis, it is wrong to think that the majority of the common citizens in Africa are not managing their confl icts. Indeed, everywhere in Africa, people on a daily basis are busy addressing situations of domestic tension of immediate concern to them. But the causes of tension have become so many, so complex and so intolerable that without outside assistance, especially in terms of fi nancial resources, confl icts resulting from such tension cannot be meaningfully tackled even with the use of available mechanisms.
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It is equally wrong to think that AU/NEPAD has not been concerned with the issues of confl icts. Indeed, as the Secretary-General of OAU as clearly stated in his "Report on the establishment of a mechanism for confl ict prevention, management and resolution" [CM/1767(LVIII)] submitted to the fi ft y-eighth Ordi- nary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers, held from 21 to 26 June 1993, in Cairo, Egypt, "... confl ict resolution and the issue of peace, security and stability have been a major concern of our Organization from its inception. " It is also noted in the same report that the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, which was set up as the offi cial organ charged with the responsibility for peaceful settlement of disputes among Member States never became fully operational. Th e question of fi nancing its staff and operations, for instance, remained an academic exercise. Nor were other ad hoc arrangements such as Defence Commission later put in place to deal with inter-State disputes and confl icts without shortcomings. However, one would argue that they did have a positive impact on stabilizing situations of confl ict among Member States. 
Involvement of African Union in Darfur Crisis
Th e root of the Darfur confl ict is a struggle over controlling an environment that can no longer support all the people who must live in it. Casual observers from around the world will be forgiven for having reached a disjointed picture of events and the root causes of events in Darfur over the past two years. Something which has led to similarly disjointed conclusions and unrealistic solutions. A combination of lazy and oft en sensationalist media coverage and the activities of an already active anti-Sudanese campaign have sought to reduce the incredibly complex Darfur issue to one of an attempt by an Arab-dominated government in Khartoun to wipe out its black citizens in Darfur. Some, who know a little better, accept the fact that the Darfur rebels are the ones who started the confl ict by attacking police stations, army garrisons and nomadic leaders and communities and so doing murdering hundreds of policemen and precipitating a break down in law and order.
As can be ascertained from any reliable source on Darfur, it is a region inhabited by Arabs and non-Arabs alike. Th ey are bound by blood through centuries of intermarriage. Th e two rebel groups are drawn from three tribes: Zagawa, Fur and Masalit. Th ere are more than eighty diff erent tribes and ethnic communities in Darfur. Any solution that would reward those who carry arms in a deliberate attempt to destabilize Africa's largest country will become a recipe for a full scale war that will spill over the border of Sudan.
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Th e African Union, (AU) formed in 2002 from the vestiges of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), aims to protect the security of the continent rather than the sovereignty of individual states. Th ough, the African Union still, is struggling to reform its governing bodies, it plays an increasingly high-profi le role in peacekeeping. Most recently, the African Union has sent peacekeepers to Somalia and Darfur, the latter in an unprecedented joint peacekeeping operation with the United Nations. Experts said that the African Union has a long way to go before it is fully functional and expressed concerns about the burdens and expectations that have been placed on the body thus far.
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In 2002, the Organization of African Unity transformed itself into the African Union (AU). Th e OAU, founded in 1963 on the principles of state sovereignty and noninterference, drew criticism throughout the 1990s for its lack of intervention as crises unfolded in Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia. Frustration at its ineff ectiveness led African leaders spearheaded by Libyan leader, Muammar el-Qaddafi , to launch the African Union, a body with a structure modeled on that of the European Union. Fift y -three countries in Africa are members of the African Union (Morocco is the only African country that does not belong), which has its headquartered in Addia Ababa, Ethiopia.
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Th e African Union/NEPAD seeks to increase development, combat poverty and corruption and end Africa's many confl icts. "Th e AU/NEPAD is the world's only regional or international organisation that explicitly recognizes the right to intervene in a member state on humanitarian and human rights grounds. " AU drew these guidelines based on the recommendations of a 2002 report from the International Commission on Intervention and state sovereignty entitled Th e Responsibility to protect. Th e report asserts that "sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from unavoidable catastrophe -from mass murder and rape, from starvation but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states. " Prior to the deployment of the joint peacekeeping force, experts had serious reservations about the ability of the AU peacekeepers to work eff ectively. Everyone knows this has been undermanned, understaff ed, undertrained and under-resourced force. 26 With the joint force on the ground, experts say some of the same problems remain. While the focus has a more robust mandate than the previous AU force, it still lacks important equipment and a critical mass of troops. Th e United Nations says its goal is to have 97 percent deployment by the end of 2009. Some experts said that even once full deployment is reached; the troops will not be able to end the crisis. Even if the force consisted of the fi nest elite troops in the world, they could not have resolved the problem.
Crisis in Cote D'Ivoire and AU/NEPAD Intervention
Th e current crisis in Cote D'Ivoire is a severe test for the regional body, ECO-WAS and the much for touted NEPAD. For the umpteen time, the West African sub-region and Africa as a whole have been called to duty to halt the continuing bloodbath and carnage that oft en plaques the continent. Cote D'Ivoire, the latest in the long list of African countries best with military adventures is still reeling under a mutiny that has led to the death of hundreds of people including a former Head of state, General Robert Guei. Cote d'Ivoire's political problems intensifi ed aft er the death of its founding President, Houphouet Boigny, on 7 December 1993. Prior to his death, the country enjoyed relative stability and economic prosperity in a general unstable African continent over a period of three decades aft er its independence in 1960. Th e vibrant economy attracted a large number of foreign workers, mainly from Burkina Faso, Mali and Ghana as well as investors. Lacking any political institutional structure, the passing of Houphouet Boigny, plunged the country into period of protracted power struggle, owing to its long one-party rule (despite the presence of his protégé, Konan Bedie). Former President Konan Bedie, who replaced the country long term leader, enunciated the policy of Ivoirite and succeeded in eliminating his key political opponents, including Alasssane Quattara of the Rally of Republicans (RDR). Th e power struggle centred on nationality laws and eligibility criteria for elections which favoured mainly, inhabitants from southern Cote d'Ivoire to the detriment of the northerners. Th e interplay of complex political issues related to the identity and citizenship, he quest for power and eventual political exclusion of political opponents from elections led to an unconstitutional change in government by late General Robert Guei in 1999. Th ese undercurrents include a revolt from ranks of the General's loyalist, specifi cally about 800 men who were demobilized from the national army known as Forces Armees Nationals de la Cote d'Ivoire (FAANCI) Th e bloody revolt led to the death of General Guei and some members of his family in the process. An ill-equipped and ill-prepared Ivoirian army eventually mobilized its rank and fi le, and in a few days of fi ghting repelled the rebels from Abidjan but lost the northern cities of Bouake and Korhogo. Th e confl ict has since grown in scope and intensity. (June, 2005) . President Gbagbo's original mandate as president expired on October 30, 2005 but due to lack of disarmament, it was deemed impossible to hold an election and therefore his term in offi ce was extended for a maximum of one year according to a plan worked out by the African Union, this plan was endorsed by the United Nations Security Council. With the late October deadline approaching in 2006, it was regarded as very unlikely that the election would be held that time, and the opposition and the rebels rejected the possibility of another term extension of Gbagbo's term on November 1, 2006, however, resolution provided for the strengthening of Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny's powers. Gbagbo said the next day that elements of the resolution deemed to be constitutional violations would not be applied. A peace deal between the government and the rebels, or 'New process' was signed on March 4, 2007 and subsequently Guillaume Soro, leader of the 'New Forces' , became Prime Minister. Th ese events have been seen by some observers as substantially strengthening Gbagbo's position. 28 Although, African leaders failed miserably in their bid to resolve the confl ict that emerged aft er the Madagascar elections early that year, the current interest and resolve to come to grips with the Ivorian situation become therefore very Sustainable Peace in the Sub-Region-Th e Journey so far. A Th esis submitted to the UN peace operations training Institute in the partial fulfi llment of the requirements for the award of certifi cate of training peace support operations (COTIPSO), (Armed Forces Command and Staff College, (AFCSC), Jaji, Nigeria, [72] [73] [74] undated heartwarming. 29 What make the present circumstance so stimulating is the resolve of both Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and African Union to push ahead with their new-found desire of riding the continent of poor governance, coups and corruption among others. It also falls in line with their aversion for undemocratic institutions and governments and to champion their commitment to the defence of democracy, good governance and the rule of law. Th ese concerns are explicitly enshrined in the version of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) being forged by African leaders in collaboration with their development partners. Th e New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), adopted by African leaders in 2001, places strong emphasis on achieving the political conditions necessary to help sustain the continent's development. "African leaders, " say NEPAD "have learnt from their own experiences that peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management are conditions for sustainable development. Th ey are making a pledge to work both individually and collectively to promote these principles in their countries, sub-region and the continent. " 30 NEPAD recognizes not only that peace and security can create more favourable conditions for development but also that greater development and reduced poverty can in turn make armed confl ict less likely. Long-term condition for ensuring peace and security in Africa require policy measures to address the political and social vulnerabilities on which confl ict is premised.
Th e African continent remains despicably volatile. It is already swirling with hundreds of thousands of refugees from earlier wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Even within the otherwise nominal peaceful states, internal confl icts as well as ethnic and religious sentiments are fanning a trend with the potential of tearing these countries apart.
Until recently, Cote D'Ivoire used to be a peace haven, stability and prosperity in the continent. It showcased how stability could lead to prosperity, but this has now been gravely undermined due largely to military insurgency which began in 1999. Th at was the fi rst time that the country tested the bitter pill associated with the removal of many governments in the continent.
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Th e confl ict which began on September 19, 1999 has thrown the country into a bloodbath with ethnic clashes between the people in the south and northerners. It has also pitted political activists against their perceived foes. General Guei, military ruler from December, 1999 to October, 2000 was killed during the action by government forces to suppress the uprising. Guei, had earlier been accused of involvement in the uprising which has brought death to the streets of Th e uprising which started in Ivory Coast on 19 September, 1999 has been called both coup and a mutiny. Th e soldiers who took up arms against the government denied that it was a coup. Th ey claimed that they were fi ghting against dictatorship and ill-treatment. More than 750 soldiers started the confl ict in protest against the decision of the government headed by Laurent Gbagbo, to demobilize them from the Ivorian army.
32 Following the emergency talks held in Accra on September 29 by ECOWAS members and the then African Union Chairman, Th abo Mbeki of South Africa, a six-nation mediation group has since been formed by ECOWAS to mediate in the confl ict in order to help fi nd peaceful solution to the crisis. Th e group has since prevailed upon the rebels to immediately cease all hostilities in order to restore normalcy to the occupied towns. Th e emergency meeting provided African Union with an opportunity to protect constitutional governments and help advance democracy in the continent. Th e opening statements by ECOWAS Chairman, President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, who advocated the recourse to dialogue in the bid to resolve the problem and those of the then president Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, who preferred the use of collective military force to crush the rebels were very contrasting. But collectively, it showed that the resort to unconstitutional means to stake a claim to political power on the Africa continent is outmoded, unjustifi able and therefore unacceptable now. Indeed, such disruptions to the constitutional order, many believed, must be rejected because it is in the supreme interest of the continent and its peoples to do so, particularly within the context of the globalization that Africa is functioning.
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Th e then Ghana's President, John Kufuor says, "It is a matter of great distress to leaders of ECOWAS that Cote d'Ivoire is being dragged into what may be unhappily described as the 'West African disease' of coups, mutinies and instability. " Kufour is emphatic that Africa cannot hope to develop and join the rest of the advanced world unless and until there is peace in all the component nations. Like Kufuor, the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Dr Mohammed Ibn Chambas, says; event in Cote d'Ivoire if uncontrolled will be a major setback for the implementation of NEPAD in the West African sub-region. NEPAD advocates the building of a culture of democracy, respect for human rights and rule of law as essential conditions for creating stable conditions for sustainable development. Dr Chambas observed as follows: "Today, all our loft y objectives of building peace, stability, democracy and integration in the sub-region so as to better fi ght poverty and improve the lives of our peoples stand threatened by the escalating violence and disloyal activities of certain elements of the Ivorian army. Th ese rebellious troops are in breach of their sacred oath to protect and defend the constitution of Cote D'Ivoire." 34 Both the Algiers Declaration of the African Union which was affi rmed at the Lome Summit of 2009 and the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance are emphatic that there will be no recognition for any government which comes to power by unconstitutional means. Dr Chambas advocates for zero tolerance for coups and military interventions saying, Africa must remain steadfast in defending the principle as a demonstration of commitment to build democracy and good governance in the respective countries. 'We must set a clear and unambiguous message out, not only to the rebellious troops, but also, to all the armed forces of our sub-region that the days of coup d' états are gone, " he stressed.
AU/NEPAD Mechanism for Confl ict Prevention, Management and Resolution
It may be recalled that since the turn of the 1980s, there has been a growing understanding among the OAU Member States that the Organization must show more responsiveness to new challenges, particularly in the fi eld of economic integration and development on the one hand and, especially, that of confl ict prevention, management and resolution on the other. In the case of the former, the decision was reached in 1991 to house the secretariat of the African Economic Community in the then General Secretariat of OAU. In the case of the latter, the Secretary-General's proposal in 1991 for the creation of a Division for Confl ict Management in the Political Department was approved. Th is proposal was based on the July 1990 "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World, " in which the Heads of State and Government reiterated their "... determination to work together towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of all the confl icts" in Africa -both internal and inter-State. Such resolution, they stated, would be "... conducive to the creation of peace and stability in the continent, " and would "also have the eff ect of reducing expenditures on defence and security, thus releasing additional resources for socio-economic development. " Indeed, they recognized that it is "only through the creation of stable conditions that Africa can fully harness its human and material resources and direct them to development. " Following this, the then OAU Secretary-General submitted to the fi ft y-sixth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers and the twenty-eighth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, in Dakar, in June/ July 1992, a report entitled "Report of the Secretary-General on confl icts in Africa: Proposals for an OAU mechanism for confl ict prevention, management and resolution. " Th at report outlined a number of options on the form and nature of such a mechanism. Th e Assembly then adopted, in principle, such a mechanism for preventing, managing and resolving confl icts in Africa.
Subsequently, the Secretary-General submitted to the fi ft y-eighth Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers and the twenty-ninth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, in June 1993, in Cairo, yet another report refl ecting on all aspects relating to the mechanism, including institutional and operational details as well as its fi nancing. Th e report was entitled "Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment, within OAU, of a mechanism for confl ict prevention, management and resolution. " On the strength of that report, the Assembly adopted its "Declaration ... on the Establishment, within the OAU, of a Mechanism for Confl ict Prevention, Management and Resolution. " Th e Secretary-General, under the authority of the Central Organ and in consultation with the parties involved in the confl ict, is mandated to focus eff orts on confl ict prevention, peace-making and peace-building. Indeed, it is much cheaper to concentrate on diff using tension and instability than to wait for situations of tension to turn into full-blown confl icts and then rush in to put out the fl ames of war. Peace-keeping, thus, does not constitute a priority activity for OAU then. However, by force of circumstances, the Organization may be com- pelled to deploy small-scale peace-keeping operations, mainly of an observermission character, as exemplifi ed by the OAU/AU Neutral Military Observer Group which was placed in Rwanda in 1993. In his eff orts, the Secretary-General may, in consultation with the authorities of their countries of origin, and relying heavily on their cumulative experience and deep-seated knowledge of the African historical, socio-economic and cultural condition, also resort to the use of eminent African personalities. Where necessary, he may make use of other relevant expertise, send special envoys or special representatives as well as dispatch fact-fi nding missions to confl ict areas;
In addition, within the context of the Mechanism, OAU is expected to closely coordinate its activities with African regional and sub-regional organizations and cooperate, as appropriate, with neighbouring countries with respect to confl icts arising in the diff erent sub-regions of the continent, it being understood that these regional organizations and countries are more familiar with the local issues within the sub-region in question;
Similarly, OAU cooperates and works closely with the United Nations, not only with regard to issues relating to peace-making but and especially, also those relating to peace-keeping. In like manner, the Secretary-General of OAU maintains close cooperation with other international organizations; and Finally, an OAU Peace Fund, governed by the relevant OAU Financial Rules and Regulations, has been established for the purpose of providing fi nancial resources to support exclusively OAU operational activities relating to confl ict management and resolution. It will be made up of fi nancial appropriations of 5 per cent of the regular budget of OAU, voluntary contributions from Member States as well as from other sources within Africa. Th e Secretary-General may, with the consent of the Central Organ and in conformity with the principles and objectives of the OAU Charter, also accept voluntary contributions from sources outside Africa.
With the establishment of the Mechanism, OAU's capacity to deal with confl icts in Africa has been strengthened and enhanced in order for the Organization to make eff ective contribution to the cause of peace, security and stability on the continent.
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Mention may also be made at this point of the fact that AU/NEPAD, at the invitation of the authorities concerned, has also been involved in election monitoring with the objective of assisting Member States in the peaceful management of change and in the building of democratic cultures and institutions capable of diff using tensions arising from rival political groups. AU/NEPAD has now established an Electoral Unit within the Political Department, following the July 1990 Declaration already referred to in this work, which re-affi rmed the right of African States to decide which form of democratic government might be most appropriate for them, given the existing socio-cultural values and current socio-37 Organisation of African Unity, Id, 11, E/ECA/CM./20/7. economic realities. Since 1990, OAU has monitored or observed presidential and parliamentary elections/referenda within 24 Member States.
As regards OAU's involvement in the work of the United Nations, it is to be recalled that cooperation between OAU and the United Nations in all fi elds, including peace and security, has existed since the establishment of OAU in 1963. Indeed, the OAU Charter stipulates in Article 2 one of the purposes of its establishment as the promotion of "international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. " Such cooperation derives its existence not only from the complementarily between the purposes and principles of the two organizations but also on the basis of a number of resolutions and decisions adopted by the respective legislative organs of both organizations. In this connection, special reference may be made to the Cooperation Agreement concluded on 9 October 1990, which provided for mutual cooperation in all fi elds: political, economic and social, scientifi c and cultural.
It is the understanding of OAU that the coordination of the eff orts of regional organizations with those of the United Nations, in the context of pacifi c settlement of disputes and the maintenance of international peace and security, as provided for in Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations, implies that that relationship must be conducted in such a way that the comparative advantage of the regional organization on the one hand, and that of the United Nations on the other, optimally come into play. Th us, though OAU recognizes that the United Nations, being the world body, has the primary responsibility for international peace and security and that it is endowed with greater materials and fi nancial resources, OAU brings to such a partnership its political salience as the pre-eminent, continent-wide regional organization in Africa, deriving from its proximity to and better knowledge of local African confl ict situations, the shared historical experience and culture of its Member States and the political will to resolve its own problems.
A review of recent developments in Africa clearly demonstrates that the respective roles of AU/NEPAD and the United Nations have been complementary and mutually reinforcing. To this end, special reference may be made to the successful mediation eff orts relating to the Liberian confl ict jointly conducted by the two organisations through the OAU Eminent Persons and the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Representative, together with the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS whose collective eff orts culminated in the signing of a Peace Agreement for Liberia, in Cotonou, Benin, on 25 July 1993, by the parties concerned. In the case of South Africa, Mozambique and Burundi, the observer missions deployed by the two organizations cooperated closely in eff orts to facilitate the reduction of political violence and the democratization process in those countries. In the case of Rwanda, the Neutral International Force set up in 1993 by the United Nations to implement the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda incorporated the OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG II) in its structure, which it found on the ground. As regards Somalia, OAU has fully cooperated with the United Nations in the eff orts to bring about an end to the confl ict and, in particular, in support of the process of national reconciliation. It has to be noted that President Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia was designated by the OAU Heads of State and Government to facilitate the peace process in that country on behalf of OAU. Indeed, on this issue of coordination, it is pertinent to note that the Mechanism requires OAU to cooperate and work closely with the United Nations not only with regard to issues relating to peace-making but, and especially, also those relating to peace-keeping. Further, where necessary, recourse could be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary fi nancial, logistical and military support for the OAU's activities relating thereto, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations on international peace and security.
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It is also to be noted that although, OAU is short of logistical, material and fi nancial resources, it is well disposed to providing, through its Member States, human resources for peace-keeping operations in Africa to add to the eff orts deployed by the United Nations.
Furthermore, attention should be drawn to the need to strengthen AU/ NEPAD's capacity to deal with confl ict situations in Africa. In this respect, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in their Declaration on the Mechanism directed the Council of Ministers "... in consultation with the SecretaryGeneral, to examine ways and means in which the capacity within the General Secretariat can be built and brought up to a level commensurate with the magnitude of the tasks at hand and the responsibilities expected of the Organization."
Concerning the level of cooperation between AU/NEPAD on the one hand and sub-regional organizations on the other, within the context of the AU/ NEPAD Mechanism for Confl ict Prevention, Management and Resolution, it must be noted that the establishment of that Mechanism is not aimed at marginalizing those sub-regional organisations and arrangements. On the contrary, AU/ NEPAD works in close coordination and cooperation with those sub-regional organizations and arrangements, which it sees as constituting building blocks for its Mechanism. Th e reasoning behind that cooperation is that the interrelationship between human rights, democracy, security, stability and development in Africa necessitates eff ective networking and cooperative action between AU/ NEPAD and the sub-regional groupings. Th ose groupings are at close proximity to confl ict situations; they have innate knowledge of the local confl ict situations; they have shared historical experience and culture; and they have the political will to resolve their local problems because being in the region of the confl ict, they too, in one way or the other, can be aff ected.
Two recent examples may help. Firstly, OAU's cooperative action in Liberia through its Eminent Person in the name of Professor Canaan Banana of Zimba-38 Id. bwe was not aimed at supplanting ECOWAS but rather supplementing the commendable eff orts of that sub-regional grouping. Similarly, under the fl ag of OAU and through H.E. Mr. Daniel Arap Moi, President of Kenya, the confl ict in the Sudan is now being addressed by the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD).
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It should be noted that the main focus of the existing sub-regional groupings in Africa is economic development. However, quarrels, disputes and confl icts within and even between the member States of those sub-regional groupings have slowed down their pace of integration. For those sub-regional organizations to serve as useful instruments for a confl ict management network in Africa, they need to be properly structured for such a role. Th ere is therefore, the need to identify specifi c and cost-eff ective ways to assist sub-regional organizations in their eff orts to enhance their capacity to maintain peace, security and stability within their respective member States.
Conclusion
Th e failure of the Organisation of African Unity and previous development programmes to ensure peace and security in Africa has place high expectation on the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development. 40 NEPAD is said to represent a new development agenda based on partnership with other organisations like African Union, ECOWAS (ECOMOG) and other donor or creditor countries to ensure peace in Africa. Th e question still remain that can peace and security be ensured and maintained in Africa where over 80% of its occupants are living in abject poverty, where there are no good leadership and people are affl icted with various diseases. It is therefore believed that the practice of good governance/ democratic government reduces the occurrence of violent confl icts and ensures peace and security.
Furthermore, African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development can do more in terms of ensuring peace and security in Africa if our teaming youths can be gainfully employed and there is remarkable improvement in the provision of social amenities in our continent. Various African countries must seriously tackling security challenges facing them like terrorism, proliferation of arms, poverty, unemployment, corruption, bad governance, neocolonialism, military incursion, diseases like HIV/AIDs and other forms of impediments to good governance. If this is not done, most of African resources will be expended on peace and security which will eventually be a mirage to accomplish. 
